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Abstract 
The research presented is part of a larger study aiming at the analysis of reform options for 
the EU sugar policy regime. This paper focuses on the effects of quota reduction and support 
price cuts. A thorough theoretical analysis investigates the implications of farm heterogeneity 
for aggregate supply modeling purposes under the current sugar regime. It can be shown that 
the treatment of sugar quantities produced under the different quotas and without quota can 
be treated as different products in an aggregate profit function analysis. Marginal and discrete 
price and quota effects are derived. Subsequently, the derived behavioral characteristics are 
implemented in the framework of the agricultural sector model CAPSIM to provide a broader 
policy evaluation. Preliminary simulation results are presented for the EU at aggregate level. 
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 1 Introduction 
The EU sugar market regime has withstood any agricultural policy reform in the last 4 
decades despite some effort by agricultural economists pointing at the implied negative 
welfare effects (e.g. Koester and Schmitz 1982, Mahler 1994, Bureau et al. 1997). The 
“secret” of the production quota based policy was to not touch what seems to worry 
politicians more than diminished consumer rents: the budget. But suddenly the invulnerability 
of the regime is threatened, mainly by committed tariff preferences and import guarantees to 
developing countries. Under the “everything but arms” (EBA) agreement of the EU with the 
least developed countries the EU has accepted duty free imports of “everything but arms”, 
and what is most important here, this includes sugar. This policy might significantly increase 
budget costs of the current sugar market regulation through increased interventions cost and 
export subsidies. This in turn could conflict with existing WTO agreements and current 
negotiation strategies. Consequently, the European Commission has a strong interest in 
evaluating likely consequences of different reform options for the sugar market policy 
(European Commission 2001). These options include quota reduction, decreased support 
price, and allowing for tradable quotas.   
This paper aims at providing some theoretical and preliminary quantitative insights to 
the impacts of these options on sugar beet production, income, and welfare at the aggregate 
level.
3 It is organized as follows: First, a brief overview on the current EU sugar policy is 
given.  Then, theoretical implications for aggregate modeling of producer behavior under the 
quota regime are presented. Farm specific profit maximization models are aggregated 
                                                 
3  Even though CAPSIM simulations will also contribute to the official assessment of the reform options by the 
Commission, the current specification of the modeling system and the interpretation of options has been solely 
under the responsibility of the authors. Given that the model is still under construction and that certain policy 
parameters are still excessively simplified for official use it is very likely that the final CAPSIM results on 
these options will look different. Therefore, this paper does not allow any inference on the future assessment 
of the Commission.  
  1observing the distribution of efficiency and quota allocation across farms leading to 
comparative static results for quota reduction and support price cuts. Based on these 
theoretical considerations, the representation of sugar supply behavior in the European Sector 
Model CAPSIM is motivated. Subsequently, aggregate results for scenarios with quota 
reduction and support price cuts are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn and research 
paths to improve upon the current modeling state and to evaluate additional reform options 
are outlined.  
2  Common Market Organization (CMO) for Sugar in the EU 
2.1  Brief Sketch of Current Measures 
The EU's common market organization for sugar (CMO-sugar) is part of the common 
agricultural policy (CAP) and was put in place in 1967. It was designed to harmonize the 
sugar policy between the member states while keeping producer support at least as high as 
with previous national measures. Similar to CMO's for other products, minimum support 
prices with an accompanying intervention purchase system were implemented. The internal 
market was protected by import tariffs and export refunds. However, in addition to these 
typical CMO instruments, a production quota system limited the quantity eligible for price 
support through intervention mechanism and thereby the costs of intervention purchases. At 
the same time, the quota allocation to member states implied a certain national market share 
regardless of efficiency. It was mainly the cost saving nature of the quota system which 
allowed the CMO sugar to move basically unchanged through major reforms of the CAP - the 
MacSherry reform in 1992 and Agenda 2000. 
The quotas allocated to each member state define the sugar quantities that can be sold 
in the EU and consequently limit the supply in this market. Production quantities above the 
quota, the so called C-sugar, are allowed, but must be sold on the world market. The two 
  2types of quota, A and B, are differentiated by the levies applied to cover the cost of export 
and production refunds
4 of quota sugar: 
¾  a basic levy of up to 2% of the intervention price applied to both A- and B-sugar (always 
applied since 1990/91) 
¾  a variable levy with a maximum of  37.5% of the intervention price applied to B-sugar 
(lowest percentage since 1990/91 was 30.4% in 1991/1992) 
¾  an additional levy as percentage of the basic and B-sugar levy in case those were not 
sufficient to cover the cost (applied 3 times since 1990) 
The B-quota in percent of the A-quota differs between member states (highest is 
Germany with 30.8% and lowest in Spain with 4.2%). Higher B-quota shares reflect 
perceived comparative advantages of certain member states with respect to sugar production 
at the time of implementation. They were supposed to allow for an expansion of production at 
relatively low product prices. National quota quantities have been nearly unchanged for the 
last 20 years. During the same time period there has been only one incidence of intervention 
purchases. Apparently, the sugar export with refunds is more attractive for sugar processors. 
The member states allocate the quotas to sugar processors, which in turn give delivery 
rights to sugar beet producers. The share of A and B quota for producers typically equal the 
national shares. Sugar processors are legally bound to pay minimum beet prices to producers, 
which calculate as 58% of the intervention price minus the relevant levies. Typically, 
producers receive A-quota prices until their individual A-quota is filled, then B-quota prices 
apply until the overall quota is exhausted. All remaining quantities delivered are paid 
depending on the sugar prices obtained on world markets in the respective marketing year. In 
                                                 
4 The sugar using chemical and pharmaceutical industries receive production refunds to compensate for the 
additional cost caused by the high sugar prices within the EU.  
  3some member states, average pricing schemes are applied (for example on A and B quota 
quantities in the Netherlands and Belgium).  
Figure 1 presents average EU and world sugar prices over the last 20 years illustrating 
the success of the policy in isolating the European sugar market and providing an income 
premium to sugar beet producers and sugar processors relative to world market conditions. 
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This brief sketch of the CMO-sugar already hints at potential difficulties in projecting effects 
of various reform options. Empirical model specification is hampered by the fact that no 
variation in quota allocation across member states and within member states as well as 
significant price variation for EU producers has been observed. Also, the heterogeneity of 
farms determines the efficiency gain to be expected from any deregulatory measure. At first 
look, it seems questionable whether an aggregate analysis is capable at all to represent sugar 
beet supply behavior in an adequate way. We will now look at this problem in a formal way.  
2.2  Sugar Beet Supply – Farm and Aggregate Level 
Let the farm level cost function of farm i be:  
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  4where  
C
i  =  farm level cost function 
T
i  =  farm level technology 
w  =  column vector of input prices 
x
i  =  column vector of input quantities 
i
s − y    =  column vector of non sugar outputs 
i
s y    =  sugar beet production  
 
Observing quantitative restrictions inherent in the sugar CMO, but neglecting 
aversion to the potential risk of loosing the quotas in case of incomplete use, we may express 
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where  
i
a y   =  production quantity of A sugar beet 
i
b y   =  production quantity of B sugar beet 
i
c y   =  production quantity of C sugar beet 
Qa   =  aggregate quota for A sugar beet 
Qb   =  aggregate quota for B sugar beet 
α
i   =  share of farm i in the aggregate quotas (
ii
ia ab qQ qQ = b α= ) 
pa   =  price of A sugar beet 
pb   =  price of B sugar beet 
pc   =  price of C sugar beet 
p-s  =  column price vector of non sugar products  
 
First order conditions reveal – depending on quota endowment and the position of the 
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These cases are ordered to represent increasing marginal cost and may be depicted 
graphically as in figure 2.  




























In a certain region we observe several farm types at the same time because quota 
endowments and farm efficiency follow a distribution with significant variance. It is quite 
clear that the regional aggregate response to changing prices or quota quantities depends on 
this distribution and treating each region as homogenous in terms of one of the five farm 
types (see, for example, Frandsen et al. 2001) will cause some aggregation error. Before we 
develop an aggregate modeling strategy for the evaluation of reform options we first want to 
investigate what implications follow from farm heterogeneity. To this end we derive the 
aggregate regional profit function for a heterogeneous population of farms. 
  6It will be helpful to recognize that each of the above farm types is responsive – at the 
margin – to only one sugar related exogenous variable. Type 1, for example, reacts to 




b q ) only determine which type applies. Unless there are large changes in these variables, 
transforming type 1 farms to another one, maximum profit may be determined from  
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Sugar beet supply is determined by the price of C-sugar beet pc which enters a price 
dependent profit function whereas quotas and prices for A- and B-sugar beet only determine 
the additional pure rent income. For farm type 2 the combined A- and B-sugar beet quotas 
determine a quantity dependent restricted profit function π
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Profit and behavior for farm type 3, which does not fully exploit its B-quota, again follow 
from a price dependent profit function
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The price of B-sugar beet determines behavior whereas quota and price for A-sugar beet are 
important for the pure rent income. Farm type 4 is constrained by it’s A-quota such that 
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Finally we have farms of type 5 which do not even make full use of their A-quota: 
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The analysis above reveals that farms belong to certain types according to their 
marginal cost evaluated at the quota levels. Farm level costs depend on farm efficiency and 
on the farm's product mix (
i
s − y ,
i
s y ). Consider the level of non-sugar outputs 
i
s − y  = 
( )
i
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i
s  which solve the quantity constrained problems in (4) and (6). Furthermore, 
take farm level efficiency to be an explicit argument of the cost functions C(.): 
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Profit functions based on these cost functions will inherit the farm index as an explicit 
argument, for example:  
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Now imagine the farms to be ordered according to their marginal cost at the A+B- 
quota-levels with non-sugar outputs 
i
s − y  optimally adjusted: 
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Farms with Cs(.) < pc will be of type 1, i.e. producers of C sugar beet. They will be 
characterized by high farm efficiency and/or low quota endowments. Farms with Cs(.) > pc 
will belong to one of the other types. With many farms in a region forming a continuous 
distribution, the ordered index of a farm just unconstrained by its A+B-quota - that is at the 
margin of farm types 1 and 2 - may be considered an implicit function of prices and 
aggregate quotas: 
(12)  () ( ) ss a bc b s a b C, , Q Q , ip ii , , Q Q , p −− += ⇔ = + wp wp c          
  8The number of C-sugar beet producers will decline with rising prices of alternative crops 
(∂ib/∂p-s < 0) and with rising aggregate quotas (∂ib/∂Q < 0) but it will increase with rising 
prices of C-sugar beet. In an analogous way, we may find the border between the quota 
constrained farm type 2 and the unconstrained B-producer type 3 according to equality of 
marginal cost, evaluated at the A+B quota levels, with price pb: 
(13)  () ( ) ss a bb b s a b C, , Q Q , ip ii , , Q Q , p −− += ⇔ = + wp wp b          
Similarly we find the borders between farm types 3 and 4 and between types 4 and 5: 
(14)  () ( ) ss a b a s a C , ,Q ,i p i i , ,Q ,p −− =⇔ = wp wp b          
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These borders are the final building blocks to calculate the average profit function for a 
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where ib, ib, ia and ia are defined in (12) to (15), ns is the total number of farms endowed and 
not endowed with sugar beet quotas, respectively, f(i) is the density of the sugar beet farmers 
index. As reflected in (16) Average profit and netput behavioral functions also depend on the 
  9farmers without sugar beet quotas which may be simply ordered according to their profit 
forming an index “e” with density g(e). In (16) it is assumed for simplicity that their number 
n-s is determined by ownership of fixed factors, the distribution of which is considered. 
Equally it is assumed that the quota allocation α(i) has been fixed, sometime in the past. To 
account for free entry and exit into farming n-s might be considered the price dependent index 
of the marginal firm with zero profits (Coyle and Lopez 1987). Total profit and netput supply 
follow from multiplication with (ns + n-s).  
Taking the derivatives of Π(.) with respect to prices using Leibnitz' rule, for example 
pa, illustrates that Hotelling’s Lemma holds for this average profit function as for an 





















( , ,p ,p ,p ,Q ,Q ) Y( , ,p ,p ,p ,Q ,Q )
p
i( , ,Q ,p )
y( , , p, i ) f ( i ) d i ( , , p, i) f ( i)
p
i( , ,Q ,p )































(i)Q f(i) di (i)Q f(i) di +α +α ∫∫∫
  
The first integral is the production of sugar beet by unconstrained type 5 farmers to which the 
A-quota quantities of all other sugar beet farmers are added. The additional effects of pa 
through the change in the border ia cancel by construction of the farm index i because for the 
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  10because the optimal sugar production ys
* = α(ia) Qa for i = ia. Production of "A sugar beet" 
falls short of the A quota if there are some type 5 farmers who voluntarily do not fully exploit 
their A-quota. 
The average production of B- and C- sugar beet can be derived analogously (with 
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In the same manner we might derive the production of non sugar outputs Y-s(.) from 
the derivative of Π(.) wrt p-s . This is omitted here because the result that total output is the 
integral of farm level output over all farms is not very surprising. Given the objective of this 
paper it is more interesting to investigate how total sugar production Ya(.) + Yb(.) + Yc(.) 
reacts to changes in prices and quotas.  
2.3  Supply Response to Changing Prices and Quota Quantities 
Given the limited length of the paper, it is impossible to present and explain all derivatives of 
the sugar supply function with respect to prices and quotas. Instead, the following table shall 
  11give an indication of the direction of change when changing exogenous variables in our 
context:
5 
Table 1 : Marginal Effects of Exogenous Variables on Sugar Beet Production: 
          exogenous  
endogenous 
w  p-s  pa p b p c Q a Q b 
Ya  −  −  + 0 0  0<x<1 0 
Yb  −  −  0 + 0 −  0<x<1 
Yc  −  −  0 0 + −  − 
Ys  −  −  + + +  0<x<1 0<x<1 
 
With respect to the formal background of table 1 it shall be reported that the marginal 
response of average supply with respect to prices follows only from the integration of farm 
level responses, because all effects of sugar beet prices on the borders of farm types drop out 
at the margin. One consequence of this is that the aggregate profit function inherits convexity 
in prices from farm level profit functions, because integrals of convex function are also 
convex. The production of A-sugar beet is independent from the prices of B- or C-sugar beet 
and vice versa. Increased production quotas cause increases in the respective quantities but 
decreased production of lower valued quantities. 
Because of the relevance in our context, we want to pay more attention to non- 
marginal changes of beet prices and quotas. They are best calculated as the differences of two 
supply quantities. It will be more interesting to investigate the effect of a non-marginal 
change in the B sugar beet price pb (Figure 2), because the effect of price pa will be negligible 
in practice given that type 1 producers are very rare in most regions. 
                                                 
5 Formal derivations can be obtained from the authors upon request. 




































Based on figure 2 and the B-sugar supply function (19), the increase in production of 
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For the case of a price increase, ib
2>ib
1, because some farms who did not make any use 
of their B-quota will use it partially and thus move from type 4 to type 3 (dotted lines in 
figure 2). The first integral gives this new production of B-quota beets. The second integral 
gives the additional production of B-quota beets on farms belonging to type 3 both before and 
after the price change (solid lines in figure 2). Finally a price increase will imply ib
2 > ib
1, 
because some farms who did not before will fully exploit their B quota now, that is they will 
  13move from type 3 to type 2 (dashed lines in figure 2). The "old" set of type 2 producers and 
the type 1 producers will make full use of their B quota at both prices and hence do not 
contribute to the impact of the change in pb. Furthermore, type 5 farmers and a part of type 4 
farmers will not change their status for moderate but non-marginal changes. Hence the 
production of A-sugar beet and C-sugar beet will not respond at all to moderate price changes 
of B sugar beet, just as is case for marginal changes.  
Note, that typical aggregate models would not correctly capture the response to 
changes in the price of B-sugar beet. If the region were modeled as if it had a marginal cost 
curve index of i<ib
1, and hence remain in a type 1 or 2 situation, the aggregate response 
would incorrectly predicted to be zero. A zero response would also result if the region were 
taken to operate as a pure type 4 or 5 farm with farm index i>ia
2. If the region were finally 
modeled as if it had a farm index of ib
1<i< ia
2 the aggregate response would be overestimated. 
An improved approach might be to distinguish farm types 1-5 and model their behavior 
separately. While being an improvement over a simple representative agent approach it 
would miss the endogenous regrouping of farms, which tends to limit the aggregate response. 
This is because the type-switching farmers (see the dashed lines in figure 2) are constrained 
in their response to a change in pb.  
Because a change in the B-quota is a relevant policy option, we will investigate it for 
non-marginal changes as well: 
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Based on figure 3 and the B-Sugar Supply function (19), the effect on the production 
of B sugar beet Yb may be calculated as follows: 
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With a decrease in the B-quota, both indices for the borders between types 2 and 3 and 
between types 1 and 2 will increase. For the graphical presentation we assume that some 




2. Some former type 3 
farmers will become constrained type 2 farmers such that their cut in B-sugar beet production 
is less than their quota cut (first integral in (19)). Farms of type 1 will completely substitute 
an increase in C sugar beet for former B-sugar beet, whereas some type 2 producers will do 
so partially. Consequently the decrease in total sugar production will be clearly less than the 
cut in the B-quota. 
  15In order to lead over to the simulation exercise presented below, we want to collect 
the relevant findings of our theoretical considerations in this respect: 
The profit maximization model of the sugar beet producing farm in the EU shows that 
each farm operates at one out of 5 possible cases depending on the marginal cost at 






Ordering farms according to their marginal cost at quota levels and incorporating the 
farm index as an argument leads to regular profit and derived supply functions for the 
average or aggregate farm. 
Derived aggregate behavioral functions depend on the separate prices for A-, B, and 
C-sugar with distinct effects on other endogenous model variables. This allows (and 
requires) treating the corresponding sugar beet quantities in an aggregate analysis as 
separate products. 
The theoretical analysis provides quantitative ranges for the supply response to 
changes in aggregate quota levels (without change in relative allocation across farms). 
The behavioral functions depend on an exogenous allocation of sugar beet quotas to 
farms. Any change in this allocation implies different quantitative responses to 
marginal and discrete variations in exogenous variables. 
3  The CAPSIM Model 
3.1  Objectives and Overview 
The common agricultural policy simulation model (CAPSIM) is being developed to serve as 
a speedy and user-friendly policy information system for the European Commission. It is the 
  16successor of the medium-term forecasting and simulation model (MFSS, see Witzke, 
Verhoog and Zintl 2001).
6 The main objectives of the modeling system are 
¾  detailed coverage of products and CAP policies 
¾  results for the major variables of political interest: agricultural income, market 
balances and trade, consumer and budgetary impacts 
¾  reliability of results an member state level 
¾  user friendliness through ease and speed of operation as well as transparency 
The enumeration of these objectives might already make clear that CAPSIM is not a 
typical academic tool of analysis. It is designed for quick, repeated policy analysis, requiring 
sufficient transparency to allow discussion of model assumptions and scenario specification 
with EU officials. Together with the need for a rather disaggregated product list, those 
characteristics require some trade-offs that limit the theoretical complexity of the system. The 
choices made in model design, however, try to compromise little on the reliability of results. 
As the development of CAPSIM from the predecessor MFSS is still incomplete, the 
following explanations refer to the intermediate version used for the simulations in this paper. 
CAPSIM is currently a comparative static modeling system, driven by a set of synthetic 
elasticities. The behavioral functions are based on profit and utility maximization. They are 
completed by a set of accounting identities to form a complete set of market balances for 
agricultural products as covered by the Economic Accounts for Agriculture (EAA). Market 
clearing is either obtained by endogenous trade volumes and policy intervention or through 
endogenous prices depending on policy and market characteristics relevant for the specific 
commodity. The database mainly integrates different data domains of the Statistical Office of 
the European Communities (Eurostat) which comprise market balances, production statistics 
                                                 
6 The description of the modelling system has to be general and informal here for space limitations. For further 
detailed information see to Witzke, Verhoog, and Zintl (2001), which has been published before the name 
change to CAPSIM and is the most current available description of the system.   
  17and the EAA. Due to missing data and inconsistencies, the database compilation has been 
handled by a separate modeling activity (Britz, Wieck, Janson 2002). 
3.2 Supply  Specification 
The supply specification explicitly distinguishes between activity levels and yields of 
about 30 production activities. However, yields are taken exogenous to simplify the model 
both from a theoretical and practical point of view. It appears that variations in intensity add 
little to the aggregate supply response (FAPRI 2000, p. 55).  
The underlying profit maximization model endogenously determines activity levels 
and input demands. Further characteristics include a feed technology separable from crop 
activity levels and the explicit incorporation of land and calves balances. With the exception 
of feed demand, input prices and revenues per activity unit drive behavioral functions. The 
latter are calculated based upon market prices, price supports, and yields as well as hectare or 
livestock premiums.  Feed demand functions are conceptually derived from a cost function 
and include animal activity levels and feed prices as determining factors.  
The underlying optimization model provides an explicit framework for the calibration 
of activity and input demand elasticities based on a Maximum Entropy procedure observing 
microeconomic conditions in the base year situation. In the intermediate version of CAPSIM 
most behavioral functions are expressed in double log form.  
3.3  Demand Specification and Market Clearing 
The modeling of food demand is modeled based on a utility maximization model 
subject to a budget constraint. Consumer prices, total private expenditure, and population 
determine derived demands. Again, standard microeconomic conditions are imposed 
including full curvature. The specification is derived from a Generalized Leontief cost 
function   (see Witzke, 2002). 
  18For most products, processing and price linkages between producer and consumer 
prices are not explicitly modeled. A fixed “marketing margin” applies in these cases. For the 
case of oilseeds, potatoes, olives, and “other cereals”, milk, and sugar beet, an explicit 
processing model at the EU-level is included. With the exception of the last two products, 
processing quantities are determined based upon a behavioral function derived from a profit 
maximization hypothesis subject to fixed processing coefficients. Due to the absence of 
significant raw product trade in milk and sugar beet, it may be assumed for these products 
that basically the complete usable production is also processed. For sugar beet, this is 
combined with a constant return to scale assumption for the processing technology leading to 
a fixed processing cost. 
3.4 Policy  Representation 
Overall the most important support instrument of the current CAP is the system of 
premiums for crop and livestock activities. These premiums have been constrained by 
ceilings, again reflecting the overriding importance of budgetary considerations in the EU. 
An obligatory set aside rate accompanies the system of premiums. To account for the 
counteracting response of voluntary set aside to a change in the obligatory set aside rate, the 
latter translates less than proportionally to the effective set aside area in the model. The milk 
quota regime is implemented in a standard way. This leads to a divergence of market 
revenues and shadow revenues, the latter of which have been specified in view of results in 
Barkaoui, Butault, and Guyomard 1997.  
Most interesting for this paper is the implementation of sugar policies. According to 
section 2.3, A-, B-, and C-sugar beet are treated as separate products with strong supply 
response to changes in the respective quotas. Those may be considered as fixed factors in 
formal terms. The crucial elasticities will be specified based on an analysis of FADN data, 
  19which is not yet finished. To obtain the operational intermediate version we relied on the 
following assumptions on some of the required elasticities: 
Table 2: Preliminary Specification of Sugar Beet Elasticities: 
       exogenous 
endogenous  
pa p b p c Q a Q b 
Ya  0.005  0  0 0.99 0 
Yb  0 0.1 0  −0.2  0.9 
Yc 0  0  0.5 −0.2  −0.04 
 
The self-financing character of the sugar market organization has been incorporated in 
CAPSIM. Consequently the levies on B-sugar have to finance the export subsidies for A+B- 
sugar which are not covered by the basic levy. This accounts for the increase in the producer 
price of B-sugar beet after an increase in the world market price of sugar or a decrease in the 
sugar quota. As long as they are below international prices, EU market prices proportionally 
follow any change in the EU intervention price. Consequently, it is assumed that EU 
authorities adjust export subsidies exactly by the amount necessary to bring about this 
parallel movement which has been observed in the past even though market prices are usually 
somewhat higher than intervention prices.  
4  Scenario Specification and Results 
4.1  Scenario specification  
The chosen simulation year is 2011. The Reference run implies the full implementation of the 
Agenda 2000 package (see European Commission 2000 or Witzke, Verhoog, Zintl 2001 for 
details).   
¾  Administered  prices for cereals, beef and raw milk reduction in accordance with 
Agenda 2000.  
¾  Per-hectare premiums for cereals rise to compensate for the decline in prices, with 
little change on the durum wheat premium. Premiums for pulses and oilseeds, 
  20however, decline to more or less complete the equalization of payments with those for 
cereals. Cattle premiums rise to partly compensate for the drop in intervention prices.  
¾  The obligatory set-aside rate is set to 10 %.  
¾  Milk quotas rise in line with the Berlin summit decisions. 
¾  For sugar we assume one million tons of additional imports into the EU from EBA 
beneficiaries which effectively reduces the maximum quantity of subsidized exports 
stemming from EU A- and B- sugar beet. 
In view of the Commission’s call for proposals we specified the following policy 
options: 
¾  Option 1: Uniform reduction of all sugar quotas (A+B) by 13%. This turned out 
sufficient to not only avoid any intervention purchases but also to dispense with 
subsidized exports in spite of the new EBA imports.  
¾  Option 2: Reduction of the intervention price from 630 Euro/t to 340 Euro/t.  Even 
though the resulting intervention price is basically equal to the assumed world market 
price (339 Euro), the price decline proved insufficient in this modeling exercise to 
make subsidized exports or intervention unnecessary.  
4.2 Results   
The results are illustrative for the theoretical developments of section 3.   











Low price  - 
Reference
Soft wheat revenue 1034    1251    1250    -0.1%    1250    0.0%   
Soft wheat area 13865    14267    14310    0.3%    14265    0.0%   
Sugar beet area 2080    2099    1906    -9.2%    2029    -3.3%   
A sugar beet revenue 3056    3054    3172    3.9%    488    -84.0%   
A sugar beet area 1457    1473    1295    -12.0%    1456    -1.1%   
B sugar beet revenue 2136    3020    3195    5.8%    492    -83.7%   
B sugar beet area 311    323    297    -7.9%    269    -16.5%   
C sugar beet revenue 270    293    293    0.0%    293    0.0%   
C sugar beet area 312    303    314    3.4%    303    0.0%    
  21Given the small share of sugar beet in crop area (about 2.5%) the effects on other crops are 
almost negligible in the two policy scenarios as is visible on the example of soft wheat which 
is reproduced in the table. The different responses of sugar beet areas to changes in quotas or 
revenues are evidently related to our elasticity assumptions.  
The next table reveals the implications of these scenarios for wheat and sugar 
markets. 











Low price  - 
Reference
soft wheat producer price 116    119    119    0.0%    119    0.0%   
production 90384    111359    111716    0.3%    111348    0.0%   
total domestic use 76139    75691    75684    0.0%    75633    -0.1%   
excess supply 14245    35668    36032    1.0%    35714    0.1%   
A sugar beet producer price 53    53    57    6.7%    9    -83.6%   
production 83438    84302    74115    -12.1%    83346    -1.1%   
B sugar beet producer price 37    52    55    7.2%    9    -83.5%   
production 18206    18857    17361    -7.9%    15750    -16.5%   
C sugar beet producer price 5    5    5    0.7%    5    0.8%   
production 17865    18803    19442    3.4%    18802    0.0%   
sugar beet production 119509    121962    110918    -9.1%    117897    -3.3%   
total domestic use 118459    122282    111239    -9.0%    118218    -3.3%   
excess supply 1051    -320    -320    0.0%    -320    0.0%   
sugar market price
production 17149    17420    15773    -9.5%    16814    -3.5%   
total domestic use 12990    13934    13934    0.0%    14130    1.4%   
excess supply 4160    3486    1839    -47.3%    2683    -23.0%   
AB sugar exports 1603    1273    1    -99.9%    1    -99.9%   
C sugar exports 2557    2684    2779    3.6%    2684    0.0%   
EBA imports 0    1000    1000    0.0%    1000    0.0%   
intervention 0    529    59    -88.9%    999    88.9%    
As is evident from the table, net trade (= excess supply) of sugar beet has been fixed 
exogenously. In the above experiments the quota reduction proved more effective in curbing 
net supply. For both policy scenarios it has been assumed that subsidized exports are 
basically forbidden so that intervention purchases would be used to clear the market. This 
might not be a realistic assumption (especially as the new US farm bill will most likely 
decrease the WTO pressure on the CAP), but it provides a convenient indicator of success or 
failure of the respective option and does not change other model outcomes. In this respect it 
  22is evident that a quota cut of around 13% would be sufficient to solve the trade related 
problems of the EU. This does not hold for the price reduction scenario.  
However, in quantitative terms, the supply impact of the price decline does not seem 
very realistic. While it is perfectly plausible to assume a fairly low response of A-sugar beet 
to the own revenue at the current high prices, it may be questioned that this elasticity remains 
low for drastic price reductions such as those considered above. A different functional form 
with non-constant elasticities would have most likely changed the results in this respect. This 
issue will be addressed in the upcoming weeks, but could not be tackled at the moment.  
After completion of the database revision on subsidies, a complete welfare analysis in 
terms of producer income, consumer welfare and budgetary (EAGGF) impacts will be added 
to the market results above. This will provide a more complete picture as the income effects 
and benefits to consumers are of course quite different.  
5  Conclusions   
This paper has made a number of contributions. In theoretical terms we have 
developed the implications of farm heterogeneity for aggregate supply modeling purposes 
under the EU quota regime. The derived behavioral characteristics have been implemented in 
the framework of the agricultural sector model CAPSIM, for the time being based on 
assumed parameters. Contingent upon those, simulation results for the year 2011 have shown 
that a moderate quota reduction of 12.5% allows avoiding subsidized exports and/or 
intervention purchases, whereas a drastic reduction of prices to world market level is not 
sufficient in this respect. Apart from uncertainties with respect to the parameter specification, 
the preferability of any one of these options cannot be concluded without consideration of 
welfare effects on all involved groups.   
Research during the next months will concentrate on econometric estimation at farm 
level. This will not only provide firmer empirical ground for the parameter specification 
  23under the current quota regime, but also provide the opportunity to investigate changes in the 
aggregate supply response, if quotas were allowed to be traded between farms or regions – 
another reform option to be considered.  
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